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Kant's obscure essay entitled An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy has 
received virtually no attention in the Kant literature. The essay has been in English translation for over 
twenty years, though not widely available. In his original 1983 translation, Gordon Treash argues that 
the Negative Quantities essay should be understood as part of an ongoing response to the philosophy of 
Christian Wolff. Like Hoffmann and Crusius before him, the Kant of 1763 is at odds with the 
Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition of deductive metaphysics. He joins his predecessors in rejecting the 
assumption that the law of contradiction alone can provide proof of the principle of sufficient reason. 
The recognition that Kant's Negative Quantities essay is part of a response to the tradition of deductive 
metaphysics is, without doubt, an important contribution to the Kant literature. However, there is still 
more to be said about this neglected essay. The full significance of the paper becomes known through 
its ties to a second, empiricist line of succession. Clues to this second line of succession can be found 
in Kant's prefatory remarks concerning Euler's 1748 Reflections on Space and Time and Crusius' 1749 
Guidance in the Orderly and Careful Consideration of Natural Events. As I will show, Kant's prefatory remarks 
suggest a reading of his Negative Quantities paper that reaches beyond German deductive metaphysics to 
engage a debate regarding the application of mathematics in philosophy that traces back to George 
Berkeley. 
 
Mathematics and Philosophy 
 
Evidence to support the claim that there are two lines of succession for Kant's Negative Quantities essay 
can be found in the opening sentence of the paper. There, Kant introduces his topic as the two uses of 
mathematics in philosophy. One use, he says, concerns the imitation of mathematical method. The 
other concerns the application of mathematical propositions to the objects of philosophy. (2:167) This 
distinction between imitation and application can be linked to two different threads in the disputes 
between mathematicians and metaphysicians that followed the publication of Newton's Principia. The 
first originates with Leibniz and his deductive metaphysics; the second originates with George 
Berkeley and his critique of the calculus. Let's consider each thread in turn, with the object of 
explaining how Kant's Negative Quantities essay engages these two uses of mathematics in philosophy. 
 
The first thread concerns the imitation of mathematical method in philosophy. This use of 
mathematics can be seen in the argumentative strategy deployed by Leibniz against Newtonian 
physics. According to the imitative method, philosophical principles are granted the same certain 
status as mathematical propositions, and they provide a similar guarantee of certainty in metaphysical 
proofs. Hence, Leibniz appealed to the laws of contradiction and sufficient reason to reduce central 
claims of Newtonian physics, such as the appeal to an unobservable absolute space, to absurdity. If 
absolute space were real, Leibniz reasoned, then no point in space would differ from any other, and 
God would not have had a sufficient reason for the placement of bodies in any particular order of 
co-existence. Since this supposition is absurd and contradictory, absolute space cannot be real.  
Leibniz offered similar reductio-style proofs against other features of Newtonian physics, including 
Newton's material atoms.  
 
The empiricist response to Leibniz's attacks, as seen in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, was one of 
quick rejection; the rationalist response, by way of contrast, was gradual and hesitant. Leibniz's 
successor, Christian Wolff, adopted much of Leibniz's metaphysics, but went on to introduce 
elements into his cosmology that were clearly incompatible with the Leibnizian system. Wolff's 
modifications raised epistemological questions for his early critics. How could two incompatible views 
of substance be derived from the same first principles? Kant's immediate predecessors, Hoffmann and 
Crusius, argued that such difficulties stemmed from the misguided assumption that all philosophical 
truths, including the truths of physics, could be deduced from the law of contradiction. They proposed 
that different criteria of truth govern the ideal world of metaphysics and the real world of physics. By 
1763, Kant is evidently sympathetic to their critique. In the Negative Quantities essay, he charges that 
metaphysics has `often armed itself against mathematics' in an effort to render the mathematician's 
concepts `as nothing but subtle illusions which have little truth outside their field'. (2:167) However, 
the imitative method, it turns out, has been of little use in settling metaphysical disputes. For, `despite 
the great advantage initially promised from it', says Kant, ` [the] philosophical propositions decorated 
out of jealousy for geometry have gradually fallen away'.  (2:167)  Hence, we find that by 1763, Kant 
expresses dissatisfaction with the imitation of mathematical method in philosophy. 
 The second thread in the disputes between mathematicians and metaphysicians concerns the 
application of mathematical concepts and propositions to the objects of philosophy. This thread 
originates with George Berkeley. In his early work, Berkeley had argued that concepts such as absolute 
space were little more than useful ways of representing features of the physical world. They could not be 
traced back to sensation, and, as such, they were meaningless abstractions --- false constructions that were 
not literally true of things in nature.  In his 1734 publication, The Analyst, Berkeley turns this empiricist 
critique against the mathematical calculus itself --- the analysis of motion seen by many as the linchpin of 
theory-data fit in Newton's `system of the world'. One of Berkeley's criticisms was that its concept of 
the infinitely small was not given in sensation. As Berkeley sarcastically noted, it `requires a marvellous 
sharpness of Discernment, to be able to distinguish between evanescent Increments and infinitesimal 
Differences'. (Berkeley, 1734, § XVII) Berkeley also wondered what sort of quantity an infinitesimal 
might be. An infinitesimal greater than zero would not define anything instantaneous; an infinitesimal 
less than zero would not define anything like speed. Hence, the Newtonian explanation of motion 
depends on an appeal to calculus, but the calculus invokes fictions that cannot easily be reconciled with 
the demands of a coherent philosophy of nature. To make matters worse, Berkeley charged that there 
were serious methodological problems underlying the calculus. His main complaint in this regard was 
that the calculus violates the canons of both logic and mathematics when it arbitrarily shifts between 
positing and ignoring infinitesimal quantities. To posit a real increment as something and then later 
suppose that it is nothing is an absurd and contradictory method. (Berkeley, 1734, § XIV - XV) 
Berkeley then, had raised several substantial questions concerning the application of the mathematical 
calculus to the objects of philosophy.  
 
What we find in the Negative Quantities essay, curiously enough, is support for both Berkeley's line of 
criticism and the introduction of the mathematical concepts into philosophy. To wit, Kant thinks it 
quite proper to base observations of the nature of space on the data of geometry, and we find Kant 
applauding the `invaluable assistance' that the `infallibly demonstrated data' of geometry lend to 
philosophy. What we learn from geometry, Kant says, is that `space does not at all consist of simple 
parts'. (2:167) Here Kant appears to side with the mathematicians' analysis of space. However, in 
introducing the mathematician's concepts, he says, we must also heed the empiricist requirement that 
mathematical concepts conform to objects of sensation. As Kant stipulates, the concepts of objects 
introduced into philosophy must not be `conceived in an entirely abstract fashion' or `arbitrarily 
invented'. (2:168) Otherwise one loses the advantages associated with certain and exact starting points. 
It seems then, that the Kant of 1763 holds a complex position with respect to the application of 
mathematical concepts to the objects of philosophy. On the one hand, he is sympathetic to the 
empiricist's evidential requirement; on the other hand, he views the mathematician's concepts as 
valuable assets to metaphysics.  
 
What then, can we say by way summary about the manner in which Kant's Negative Quantities essay 
engages the two uses of mathematics in philosophy?  First, we can say that Kant expresses 
antagonism toward the imitative method. Second, we can say that Kant expresses support for the 
empiricist worry about importing abstract and arbitrary concepts into philosophy. Finally, we can also 
say that Kant seems to favour a Newtonian physics. In order to see how all of these elements come 
together in the Negative Quantities essay, we will need to consider some additional clues supplied by the 
text. These clues relate to Kant's prefatory remarks concerning Euler and Crusius. We will take them 
up in order.  
 
Euler and Kant 
 
Euler's 1748 Reflections on Space and Time is, arguably, the most important clue for interpreting Kant's 
Negative Quantities paper. Kant praises the ` the famous Euler' for his defense of Newtonian concepts of 
space and time. Metaphysics, he tells us, would do well to accept assistance from the direction of 
mathematics; for the concepts and propositions of mathematicians `exceed all others combined in 
certainty and clarity'. (2: 168) More specifically, what Euler's piece shows, Kant says, is that `the 
mathematical observation of motion joined with the knowledge of space give data to keep the 
metaphysical observation of time on the track of truth'. (2:168) Undoubtedly, Kant saw a stroke of 
genius in Euler's 1748 paper.  However, given Kant's reservations regarding the application of 
mathematical concepts in philosophy, the specific basis for Kant's approval of Euler remains unclear. 
Indeed, we have already seen that Kant denounces the introduction of `arbitrarily invented' and 
`abstractly conceived' concepts into philosophy. As it happens, Euler's 1748 defence of Newton 
overlooks these very objections. However, in order to assess properly Kant's response to Euler, we 
will need to identify both the flaws and merits of Euler's 1748 analysis, as Kant would have seen them. 
Given that Euler's piece is not widely read, and that it is an important clue to the Negative Quantities 
paper, we will review the main arguments of Euler's essay before we reflect any further upon Kant's 
response to it.  
 
In his Reflections on Space and Time, Euler directs his arguments against Newton's detractors --- especially 
Berkeley and Leibniz. Berkeley, like Leibniz, was partial to a relativistic conception of motion and 
space. He held that relative motion is the apparent motion of a body from one place to another relative 
to surrounding bodies, while relative space is the space in which such motion occurs. In addition, 
Berkeley rejected Newton's claim to have provided support for absolute space with his so-called `bucket 
experiment'. The experiment itself purported to show that an explanation of all of the effects of forces 
requires a distinction between relative and absolute motion, and hence, the introduction of absolute 
space. Berkeley, however, argued that it was not necessary to invoke the framework of absolute space to 
explain the effects in question; rather, all that was needed was the framework of the fixed stars. Euler 
rejects this relativistic position in his Reflections on Space and Time, and adjudicates the controversy by 
appeal to the two principles of inertia, which he takes to be `indisputable truths':  
 
It is thus an indisputable truth that a body once at rest will remain perpetually at rest, unless it 
is disturbed from this state by some external force. It is similarly certain that a body once put in 
motion will continue to move with the same velocity and in the same direction, provided that 
it does not encounter any impediment to the conservation of this state. (Euler, 1748, § I)  
 
Proceeding on the assumption that Newton's detractors and supporters alike are committed to the 
above propositions, Euler goes on to show, contra the metaphysicians, that we cannot explain the 
observed phenomena in a way that is consistent with the two propositions concerning inertia unless we 
introduce Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time.  
 
Euler begins his argument with the claim that whatever is said on the nature of body must conform to 
his first proposition concerning inertia. He argues that the Newtonian concept of body is required to 
explain the tendency of a body to maintain its position unless acted upon by an outside force. On the 
relativistic conception, we are required to say, by way of contrast, that a body in a flow of water 
maintains its position by actually moving downstream with the flow. This is absurd. (Euler, 1748, § 
VI-XI) Moreover, Euler claims, specifically in reply to one of Berkeley's criticisms, it is not possible to 
give an adequate account of position in relation to the fixed stars. In each case, we must appeal to the 
framework of absolute space to properly describe the body's position. (Euler, 1748, § XII) 
 It is worth pointing out that Euler's arguments regarding position would not budge a relativist such as 
Berkeley or Leibniz. For, the relativist entirely rejects the idea of position apart from the concept of the 
place that a body occupies. Moreover, both Leibniz and Berkeley would reject Euler's 
question-begging appeal to the Newtonian concept of the inertia of bodies. Whatever it was that Kant 
found laudable in Euler's 1748 piece, it is not likely to be this circularity in his argument. Moreover, 
Kant would have held that the appeal to inertia must not be based on a concept conceived in an 
abstract or arbitrary fashion. Euler misses these points of philosophical subtlety. 
 
What Euler says concerning the second proposition may get him closer to his mark. In this case, 
Euler's strategy is a clever one, since both Newton and his detractors agree to the principle of inertial 
motion. All are interested in the analysis of observed circular motions, and all agree that circular 
motions are composed of a linear inertial component and a motion of descent towards a centre. What 
Euler here argues is that the representation of a body travelling in the same direction in a uniform and 
rectilinear motion requires that space and position be explained in terms of something more than the 
co-existence of bodies. Specifically, the description requires the designation of a direction of motion, 
and this, in turn, requires an appeal to the framework of absolute space. (Euler, 1748, § XVII) To this 
argument, Euler adds a further consideration. To argue, with the relativists, that time is nothing more 
than a succession of ideas in the subject is absurd and contrary to the principle of inertial motion, 
which requires that we postulate absolute time. For, absolute time `flows and serves as a measure for 
the duration of things' --- meaning that it enables us to describe inertial motion as the linear motion of 
a body through equal spaces in equal times. (Euler, 1748, § XVIII) In thus grounding the Newtonian 
concepts of space and time in an appeal to inertial motion, Euler is attempting to ground them in an 
aspect of the mathematicians' theory that is well entrenched, but nonetheless acceptable to the 
metaphysicians. Moreover, he is quite right to claim that the principle of inertial motion requires the 
fixed framework of absolute space and time --- a point that Newton himself raised against the 
Cartesians. Unfortunately, however, this defence of absolute space and time is, once again, circular. 
This circularity is sure to have been noticed by Kant. 
 
Despite Kant's expressed admiration for Euler, there is reason to think that he saw limitations in 
Euler's answer to the metaphysicians. The difficulty is not just that the appeals to inertia are circular, 
but also that Euler fails to consider the sorts of evidential objections raised by the metaphysicians --- 
evidential objections that Kant took seriously. Indeed, Euler's only escape from circularity would 
appear to involve a controversial appeal to the calculus. For, Euler declares at the outset of his essay 
that the first principles of mechanics --- the principles concern inertia --- are established `beyond all 
doubt' by the `remarkable agreement between the results derived by means of the mathematical 
calculus and the motions of [terrestrial and celestial] bodies'. (Euler, 1748, § I) While such a declaration 
may sound fine to us, Kant was obviously preoccupied with the application problem. He alludes to the 
controversy surrounding infinitesimals in the 1763 paper, saying that `not enough has yet been 
understood about [infinitesimals] in order to bring down a judgment'. (2:168) The salient point is that 
while Kant does not take Berkeley's side, he is sure to have noticed the shortcomings in Euler's reply. 
One of the principal tasks of Kant's Negative Quantities paper, I argue, is to address empiricist concerns 
about the application of mathematical concepts to the objects of philosophy. On my reading, Euler's 
appeal to inertia raises concerns about the grounding of Newtonian concepts involved in such an 
appeal. The Negative Quantities paper offers a pre-critical account of how such representations are 
possible --- an account that invokes negative quantities and real opposition.  
 
Crusius and Kant 
 
What Kant says at the outset of his 1763 essay is that he hopes to show that the concept of negative 
quantities can be profitably introduced into philosophy. He announces that, `I have for now the 
intention of studying the relation to philosophy of a concept which is well enough known in 
mathematics but still quite foreign to philosophy'. (2:169) He elaborates further on his intentions, 
explaining that the presentation made of the concept so far has been `strange and contradictory'. 
(2:170) In fact, negative quantities were not well understood in Kant's day, and were often mistaken 
for quantities derived through the subtraction of a quantity from zero. Insofar as zero was taken to be 
a point below which there was in fact nothing, it was thought that a quantity below zero could 
represent neither a thing nor a number. Hence, negative quantities were sometimes called `false 
quantities'. Many mathematicians were convinced that it would be better to eliminate them altogether. 
Berkley, for example, wondered `whether the bringing Nothing under the notion of Quantity may not 
have betrayed Men into false Reasoning?' (Berkeley, 1734, Query 40) The main source of difficulty was 
that no satisfactory account had been given of the grounds upon which conclusions could be drawn 
from them. Were such concepts to be supported by induction and analogy or by mathematical 
demonstration?  Neither, it turns out. For, as Reid (1748) and later Kant realized, mathematical 
concepts must simply be defined. They are granted --- rather than given in experience or proven by 
demonstration. Any further justification for their use must come through establishing their usefulness. 
It is presumably with this in mind that Kant devotes the first section of his Negative Quantities essay to 
the task of defining the concept of negative quantities and then proceeds, in the second and third 
sections of the essay, to demonstrate their usefulness.  
 
With this in view, Kant begins his 1763 paper with a definition of negative quantities. The first 
conceptual issue that he raises relates to the confusion between logical and real opposition. Berkeley, 
for example, sometimes appears to confuse the notions of logical and real opposition in his appraisal 
of the calculus. The treatment of a quantity first as something and then as nothing, Berkeley claims, 
quite apart from any difficulties associated with the lack of sensible basis for the quantities, is 
sophistical and contradictory. (Berkeley, 1734, § XIV-XV) However, what Berkeley does not appear to 
realize is that there can in fact be a conceptually sound basis for treating a quantity as something and 
then nothing in mathematics. The process of `crediting' and `debiting' real opposing quantities, for 
example, does not produce a logical contradiction. (2:172) Indeed, logical opposition, Kant explains, is 
something quite distinct from real opposition. In cases of logical opposition, there is no corresponding 
representation. A logical opposition, Kant says, yields absolutely nothing, or nihil negativum 
irrepraesentabile. (2:171) However, a real opposition yields something that can be represented --- a 
cogitable privation, or nihil privatum repraesentabile. (2:172) A negative quantity represents a real 
opposition, hence, it represents a cogitable privation rather than absolutely nothing.  
 
Kant next goes on to address several other misconceptions about negative quantities. One of these 
underlies Crusius' criticisms of Newton's appeal to negative quantities. (2:169) As Kant's discussion 
makes apparent, a basic confusion regarding the meaning and use of the negative sign underlies 
Crusius' rejection of Newton's equations as ` false to the point of astonishment'.  Crusius is apparently 
laboring under the common confusion that negative quantities are negations of quantities. But, as 
Kant corrects, `negative quantities are not negations of quantities as the similarity of expression 
allowed him to conjecture. They are rather something that is truly positive in itself and which is 
opposed to the other'. (2:169) 
 
Kant offers still more by way of clarification. He places emphasis, for example, on the distinction 
between the reciprocal relationship between opposing quantities and the arithmetic operations of 
addition and subtraction. In arithmetic, placing the sign of an operator before a quantity tells us to add 
or subtract one quantity relative to another. However, the significance of the positive and negative 
signs differs in the case of real opposing quantities. Where there is a real opposition, the result may be 
zero (if positive and negative quantities cancel one another), a positive quantity (if the positive exceeds 
the negative quantity), or a quantity designated by the negative sign as its symbol (if the negative 
exceeds the positive quantity). `From this the mathematical concept of negative quantities develops'. 
(2:174) 
 
In sum, on the understanding that neither inductive reasoning nor deductive proof can establish what 
must be taken for granted, Kant's Negative Quantities essay begins with the definition of a term that has 
heretofore been applied only through the use of `special rules'. Negative quantities, Kant explains, 
result when two positive quantities cancel each other such that the negative quantity exceeds the 
positive quantity. What remains to be shown in justifying the application of this concept to the objects 
of philosophy is the extent of its usefulness to philosophy. 
 
Negative Quantities, Real Opposition and Inertia 
 
With his definition of negative quantities in hand, Kant turns in the second and third parts of his essay, 
to the usefulness of negative quantities to philosophy. His survey of the various objects that might be 
represented by appeal to real opposition and negative quantities is extensive and varied.  As it turns 
out, the concept of negative quantities may be profitably applied to the objects of natural philosophy, 
moral philosophy, metaphysics, aesthetics, and so on.  While it is not possible to consider all of Kant's 
examples here, we can follow the main focus of his discussion, which concerns the objects of natural 
philosophy.  
 
Kant mentions a number of cases of real opposition in natural philosophy. He claims, for example, 
that the concept of rest is properly explained as a state that results from the complete cancellation of 
opposing forces. (2:178-9) Similarly, the concept of impenetrability, he says, `presupposes a genuine 
power in the parts of the body by means of which these parts together occupy a space, as that power 
does with which another [body] attempts to move into this space'. (2:179) He further claims that the 
concept of a body is the concept of something that occupies a space `through the conflict of two 
forces opposing each other'. (2:180) Later in his paper, Kant reflects at some length on the concept of 
an alteration, another concept, he says, that presupposes the sort of cancellation of one thing by 
another that is characteristic of real opposition. (2:191-2) It is here that Kant distinguishes between 
two kinds of real opposition; namely, `actual opposition' and `potential opposition'. In the former 
case, there is an existing opposition; in the latter, the objects in question `only stand in potential 
opposition'. They `are such as to belong to different things [so that] one does not immediately cancel 
the result of the other'. (2: 193) Hence, for two bodies moving toward each other with equal force in a 
straight line communicate forces upon impact, one force can be said to negate the other. For two 
bodies moving away from each other with equal force in the same straight line, no force is 
communicated, and the forces merely stand in potential opposition to one another. (2:193) The point 
of introducing this distinction, it soon becomes apparent, is to prepare the way for a new foundation 
for inertial motion. Indeed, Kant next claims that the rules of mechanics --- regardless of their 
derivation in physics --- actually depend upon a metaphysical foundation build upon an appeal to 
potential opposition and negative quantities. (2:195) The fundamental principle at issue, he claims, is a 
principle that governs how we must think alterations,  
 
In all natural alterations of the world, the sum of positive things is neither increased nor 
diminished insofar as these are computed by adding positions which are in agreement (not 
those opposed to each other) and subtracting from one another those that are really opposed. 
(2:194) 
 
According to Kant, this principle governing representations of alteration is not intended as a 
metaphysical claim. Rather, it is a rule for representing the actual or potential opposition of things. 
(2:198) Representations of alterations are foundational to mechanics, and the above rule supplies the 
true ground for representations of quantity of motion and of force. Hence, we should judge that, `The 
quantity of motion is not altered by reciprocal activity ... if the forces of bodies that direct this motion 
towards the same side are taken together, and those which are directed towards the opposed side are 
subtracted'. (2:195) `Even if this rule', he insists, `is not deduced in pure mechanics from the 
metaphysical foundation from which we have derived the universal proposition, in fact, its veracity rests 
upon this basis.' `For the law of inertia which in the usual proof constitutes the fundamental 
proposition [of mechanics], merely borrows its truth from the basis of the proof cited here as I could 
easily show were I allowed to be prolix.' (2:195)  
 
 Although Kant does not fully explain the sense in which real oppositions and negative quantities 
ground the principle of inertia in his 1763 essay, it is clear that he took the provision of a foundation 
for this principle to be an important task. Indeed, Kant's new foundation for inertia not only addresses 
the application problem; it also provides a non-circular basis for an appeal to inertia in defense of 
absolute space and time. In light of this, we can make sense of Kant's claim that the concept of 
negative quantities --- a concept that is grounded in either the real or potential opposition of positive 
quantities --- holds great promise for the objects of philosophy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What was the purpose of Kant's 1763 Negative Quantities essay? In one sense, Kant's aims are 
continuous with those of Hoffmann and Crusius. Like his predecessors, Kant rejects the view that the 
true concepts of nature follow from logical laws such as the law of contradiction or identity. It is one 
thing, Kant says, to grasp an analytic connection between a ground and consequence, but quite 
another to explain the criteria of real possibility. `But how something follows from something else, yet 
not according to the rule of identity' Kant writes, `--- that is something which I would be glad to be 
able to make plain'. (2:202) Hence, as Treash correctly notes, the Negative Quantities essay is part of a 
critique of the deductive style of metaphysics that takes ideal grounds as the sole arbiters of reality. No 
less important to our understanding of the 1763 essay is its second, empiricist line of succession. For, 
Kant evidently intends the paper to address the issues raised by Berkeley's criticisms. Contra Berkeley, 
Kant has shown that there are indeed mathematical concepts consistent with the demands of a 
meaningful representation and the principles of Newtonian mechanics. What we find then, is that the 
Negative Quantities paper responds to Newton's detractors by justifying the application of mathematical 
propositions to the objects of philosophy, and hence, that the paper seems to involve not one, but two 
distinct lines of succession. With this dual perspective in view, we gain a much clearer understanding 
of the issues that Kant hoped to address in the 1763 paper. What we also find, is that the Kant of 1763 
offers a pre-critical version of the same double-edged criticism of German dogmatism and skeptical 
empiricism that will follow in his Critique of Pure Reason. From a strategic point of view then, Kant owes 
a significant debt of gratitude to Euler and his 1748 Reflections on Space and Time. 
